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1 Introduction
The stated objective ofMicrofinance is to be able enhance the lives of the poor by giving
the access to them financial services, not yet available to to them. India’s National Bank
of Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) puts it as “provision of thrift, credit
and others financial services and products of very small amounts to the poor in rural,
semi-urban or urban areas, enabling them to raise their income levels and improve
(their) living standards.” (NABARD, 2000)
There is considerable evidence that the poor often have access to credit, however
expensive itmay be, through the informalmoneymarket. The range of availablemarket
instruments for saving, with lucrative returns, is more limited.
Besley (1995, pg. 2128) cites the case of susu men or informal bankers used by mar-
ket women in Africa. The women who deposit their savings with them ”earn negative
rate of interest in exchange for safe keeping.”
There are traditional institutions like Rotating, Saving and Credit and Associations
(ROSCAs) which allow the poor to save. The problem, though, is lack of universal ac-
cess to these institutions. ROSCAs, for instance, are not as ubiquitous as the informal
moneymarkets. Options of saving, with returns comparable to cost of borrowing in the
informal money market, are more limited.
There are two obvious ways in which an intervention can improve the lives of the
poor. First, by bring down the cost of financial intermediation associated with the poor
and second, by allowing the poor also to obtain returns from the process of financial
intermediation. Practically, it would entail, not just giving the poor access to credit, at a
rates lower than the informal money market rate, but also giving them options to save,
with returns comparable to the cost of borrowing.
Literature in microfinance suggests that institutional innovations, like lending to
jointly-liable groups, has allowed the poor to get access to credit at favourable terms.
This allows them to invest in a greater range of socially viable projects and smoothen
1
their consumption to a greater extent.
The literature, hitherto, has overlooked the obvious benefits of involving savers in
group lending. Every impoverished person is a potential saver and there are distinct
benefits of involving poor in their role as savers. Apart from the obvious advantage
of improving their welfare, there is, as we see in what follows, additional advantage of
using them to solve the informational problems associated with lending to the poor.
The poor often have no collateral to offer and, for reason obvious, can be made to
bear very little liability of failure, when they borrow. Group lending works by giving
their peers the requisite incentives to solve the informational problems associatedwith
this kind of lending. Conceivably, the sharper the incentives peer have, to screen, mon-
itor and audit the borrowers, easier it is to solve the information problems. In what
follows, we document a variation of the simple group lending arrangement, as it is be-
ing practised in the Indian state of Haryana and other part of India. The poor, in this
arrangement, are involved in dual roles as both borrowers and savers.
Using a case-study approach, we anaylse the practices of a successful microfinance
operator in the Indian state of Haryana. The operator is part of, and works under the
guidelines of the Self Help Group Linkage Programmme, Government of India’s ambi-
tious microfinance initiative .
Self Help Group1 (SHG) Linkage Programme is a programme designed to encourage
microfinance operators (MfO) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) to enter
and fulfill gaps in the rural financial markets across the country. Our objective is to look
at the ground level group lending arrangement that result from the guidelines of this
programme.
We document the practices of a particular operator and analyse, in minutiae, the
actual group lending arrangement used by this operator to solve the information prob-
lems associated with lending to the poor. The SHG programme invariably creates a hi-
1The Self Help Groups are groups formed by the microfinance operator for the purposes of lending.
They are, as we see further on, different from the the simple borrower only groups. They are formed along
the lines of a modified Rotating, Saving and Credit Association.
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erarchy of relationships. We look at the measures built into the programme to prevent
moral hazard problems associated with NGO’s action.
Further, through a limited survey of the groupmembers from five groups in the area,
we build up a profile of the groups and its members. We use the information to look
at the inter-group and intra-group heterogeneity as wells as suggest a source of intra-
group dynamics. We use the information gathered during the survey to build a picture
of the local informal money market in the area and compare it to the terms offered by
the SHG programme.
The primary purpose of the exercise is to study the microfinance intervention in a
small area of Haryana, in its entirety. Starting with the programme at the national level,
we document the role of each participant in the credit chain, down to the individual
group member. As we profile the individual group members, their economic environ-
ment and their group interactions we also look at the NGO’s incentives to intervene.
In Section 2 we look at the advantages of using a modified form of ROSCA as a base
for building groups. Section 3 gives background information about the India’s SHG
Linkage Programme, Section 4 has a description of the data and section 5 presents the
some results from the survey. In section 6 we look at the process of building groups
and in section 7 we discuss how the group lending arrangement in the SHG Linkage
Programme solves the information problems associated with lending to the poor. The
conclusions are presented in Section 8.
2 Rotating, Saving and Credit Association
It is difficult to pin-point the origin of Rotating savings and credit association (hence-
forth ROSCA). Various incarnations of roscas have been existence in different parts of
the world with local names like Totine in Cameroon and Senegal, Esusu in Nigeria,
Stokvel in South Africa, Bishi and Chit Fund in India. (Bouman, 1994)
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Besley et al. (1993) rightly suggest that ”rosca constitute one of a number of insti-
tutions ... whose existence is pervasive in developing economics.” What has made it a
pervasive as well as enduring institution is its simple and intuitive rules which make
very little demand on the intellectual capability of the participants. This levels the play-
ing field for participants from all background and intellectual capability.
In its pure form, ROSCA is a group of people contributing an pre-agreed amount to a
saving pot each period. The pot accumulated each period is then allocated to a winner,
who is determined either randomly or by a bidding process. The ROSCA continues with
the winner of the pot excluded from receiving the pot in the future. It terminates after
eachmember has received the pot once.
The obvious advantage of ROSCA is that it gives eachmembers access to othermem-
ber’s saving. For instance, if amembers desires to acquire an indivisible good, by joining
the ROSCA, she can expect to attain it earlier than if she had chosen to save all by her-
self. (Besley et al., 1993) The obvious limitation of a ROSCA is that the saving pot is only
as deep as the pockets of its members. In its pure form, even though the ROSCA is an
invaluable traditional institution that allows the poor to smooth their consumption, its
scope as tool for alleviating poverty remains severely constrained.
2.1 Modifications in ROSCA
The NGO starts the process of group building by initiating a modified form of Rotating
Saving and Credit Association (ROSCA) among the individuals it is targeting. The size
of the group varies between 15 to 20.2
In themodified Rotating and Saving Credit Association (mROSCA), the group mem-
bers contribute a small agreed amount every month3 just like its pure form. The first
modification is that the saving pot is allowed to accumulate for approximately sixmonth
and during which there is a moratorium on borrowing from it. After six months, mem-
2The targeted individual maybe in close knit rural communities or in an less cohesive, urban commu-
nity
3We estimate it is approximately one days wage in our sample
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bers can borrow from it, at a rate of interest specified by the NGO and any amount
borrowed has to be repayed back in 10 installments over a period of 10 months. The
interest earned by the group funds loaned, is shared equally by all the members of the
group.
Borrowing, when it starts, is sequential and the sequence in which members get
loans is decided by the group. In the early stage of a group’s life, sequential nature of
borrowing is simply due to the limited amount of accumulated saving the group has
available to lend.
As impatient borrowers wait for an opportunity to borrow, they monitor and if need
be, audit the current borrower(s) aggressively. Lending sequentially plays an important
role in binding the individuals together in a group. If all the borrowers had been able to
borrow from the saving pot within a given time frame, the group would have a greater
chance of disbanding, like in the case of pure a ROSCA.
The sequential nature of lending induces a higher level of peer monitoring which
binds the group members, as they wait for benefits due in the future. Of course, in
the process of waiting, they also obtain reasonable returns on their savings. We found
that the returns on saving was comparable to the cost of borrowing from the informal
money market.
If the group is successfully able to manage internal group loans during this early
stage, the NGO links the group to external sources of credit. These external sources
of credit could be either a subsidised government lending programme or credit from
a public bank. NGO’s remuneration for building the groups is tied to repayment of the
external loans. Part of the interest paymentmade by the borrowers on the amount owed
(external credit) goes to the NGO.
The external loans are physically transacted through the local public bank branch
and not through the NGO. This prevents the moral hazard problem associated with the
task of channelling subsidised funds to the poor. The NGO is not allowed to take up any
task of financial intermediation. They are not allowed to even accept the group’s saving
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for the purposes of safe-keeping. The group is required to directly deposit its saving
into the group’s account st the local bank.
The NGO uses the mROSCA to tie-up a number of individuals into a group. In the
second significant modification to the pure form of ROSCA, the NGO uses themROSCA
as a platform to channel externally sourced credit to the group of impoverished individ-
uals. The group then extends this credit to its individual members. Since the external
credit is lent to the group, the group as a whole is held responsible for timely repay-
ments as well as jointly liable in case of a delay or default of repayment.
This overcomes one of the principal limitations of a pure ROSCA, i.e. volume of
credit available to its members. ThemROSCA now is a fully functioning financial entity.
The groups members are able to borrow far greater amount than the sum of its partic-
ipant’s savings. An appropriate analogy would be with a firm which is able to borrow
much more than its principal constituents are worth. (that is the aggregated value of
physical and human capital in the firm)
2.2 Advantages of a Modified ROSCA
Lending tomROSCAhas four significant advantages over lending to conventional group
composed solely of borrowers.
The first advantage is that it gives the NGO an opportunity to actively screen the
group, rather inexpensively, before extending externally sourced credit to the group. As
we noted above, the SHGLinkage Programme gives theNGOstrong incentives to screen
the groups by tying in its remuneration with the repayment of the externally sourced
loans.
Practically, the active screening process involves an individual from the NGO at-
tending the weekly groups meeting regularly and observing the characteristics exhib-
ited by the group over a period of time. These characteristic could be group’s ability to
self govern or their ability to resolve the disputes arising within the group. It could also
be observing group member’s socially connectedness or their intrinsic cohesiveness.
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It effectively allows the NGO to mimic the local moneylender and screen the group
before linking it to the external sources of credit. The cost of active screening is a frac-
tion of the cost the NGOwould have bear to get the same information in the absence of
the mROSCA.4
The second advantage is that, it allows the NGO to impose full and immediate joint
liability. In a group composed solely of borrowers, actual implementation of joint liabil-
ity takes the form of denying the group members future loans. (Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999, pg. 214) In a mROSCA, the repayments due are deducted automatically from the
group’s savings deposited in the bank account. The borrowers and the group have the
responsibility of ensuring that repayment are deposited on time in the bank account.
By paying late, the borrower jeopardise the non-borrower’s accumulated saving. Any
delayed repayment bites the non-borrowers fully and immediately making all group
members jointly liable.
Of course, full and immediate joint liability can be only implemented if the group
has at least some non-borrowers at any given time. The programme, as we see be-
low, uses the structure of the credit contract to ensure that there are always some non-
borrowers in the group.
The third advantage ofmROSCA is the the sequential nature of borrowing, it induces
within the group. In the initial stages of group’s life, the limited savings of the group
ensures that only single (or very few) borrower(s) gets the opportunity to borrow. Thus,
the paucity of funds ensure that the members borrow in a sequence.
The group, on its own, decides the sequence in which the borrowers can obtain
credit. Members wait impatiently in queue for an opportunity to borrow. They monitor
and audit the present borrower(s) aggressively to ensure that they get an opportunity to
borrow. This is crucial in binding the group and preventing it from failing as an institu-
tion in its early stages of its life.
4As we point out later, passive screening is not possible because the MfO or the NGO cannot influence
the rate of interest the charged on external credit. This is the result of disentangling the task of financial
intermediation and institution building.
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As is obvious, in a mROSCA, at any given time, a non-borrower or passive saver
has more at stake as compared to a borrower. Delinquent behaviour by the present
borrower(s) jeopardises, not just her opportunity to borrow in the future, but also her
present accumulated saving in the group. Thus, the sequential nature of borrowing in
mROSCA favourably influences that high rate of group survival during the early stages
of its life.
After the group has been linked to external source of credit, the tight inflexible struc-
ture of repayment ensures that the group alwayshas a high proportion of non-borrowers
or passive savers. According to the credit contract offered in the SHG programme, the
loan has to be fully repaid in the 10 months and the repayment start immediately. The
short window of repayment rules out projects with relatively long gestation periods.
Members borrow either to meet their consumption needs or to finance investment
projects with extremely short gestation periods. Since the repayment starts and is of-
ten expected to be completed before the benefits of the investment project accrues, it
serves to ensure that members borrow according to their pre-investment means to re-
pay.
The tightly structured repayment influences the demand for loans in two ways. It
curtails the range of profitable projects viable under the conditions. (Jain andMansuri,
2003, pg. 255) It also ensures that members only take loans they can service before the
benefits from the investment accrues. This reduces the frequency with which of mem-
ber’s submit demand for loans as well as limits the amounts members borrow. The low
frequency of demand for loans along with the short repayment window ensures that at
any givenmoment there are only a small number of borrowers in the group.
The repayment structure allows the programmedesigners to influence the frequency
of loan demand by the groupmembers. This turns out to be useful because, at any given
point in time, the non-borrowers or passive savers havemore at stake in the group than
borrowers. Thus, the fourth advantage of mRSOCA over the conventional borrower-
only groups is the greater stake savers and non-borrowers have in the group. The higher
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stakes help solve the information problems associated with lending to poor.
The SHG Linkage Programme is in probability unique among microfinance initia-
tives in being able to disentangle the task of the financial intermediation and institution
(group) building. This helps deal with the moral hazard associated with NGO’s action
in channeling (subsidized) credit to the poor. The financial intermediation or the ac-
tual physical task of channeling the money to the group is undertaken by the public
banking network in the country.5 The NGO just takes on the task of institution build-
ing. This entails forming the group and then preparing the group to transact through
public banking network.
3 Economic Environment
3.1 Rural Banking in India
The nationalisation of India’s fourteen major commercial banks in 1969 paved way for
what came to be know as the social and development banking.
The objective of nationalisation was to increase rural access to banking services and
target credit at some specific activities and certain disadvantaged groups. The Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) pursued these objective by imposing ceilings on interest rates and
setting specific targets for expansion of rural branches and sectoral allocation of credit.
In 1991, this policy was reversed after the Narsimhan Committee Report suggested
“phasing out the directed credit programmes, deregulating the interest rates and revok-
ing the branch licensing policy.” (Narasimhan, 1991). It was felt that by encumbering
the banking sector with social objectives, the state was restricting the banking sector
from competing in the global economy.
India started the slow but steady process of the dismantling its social and develop-
ment banking policy. By some accounts, the policy had enjoyed some success since
5As discussed below, there is a large public banking network in place in India which the SHG Linkage
Programme uses
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its inception in the late 1970s. “Between bank nationalization in 1969 and the onset of
financial liberalization in 1990, bank branches were opened in over 30,000 rural loca-
tions which had no prior presence of commercial banks” and the “Indian rural branch
expansion programme significantly lowered rural poverty.” (Burgess and Pande, 2004)
The 1990s sawa contracting rural banking network in linewith the recommendation
of the Narsimhan Committee Report. (See Table 1) To compensate for this, there was
a need to find a new method of disbursing credit to the rural poor, which would be
compatible with the spirit of deregulation initiated in the 1991.
The SHG Linkage Programme initiated by the National Bank of Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development’s (NABARD) emerged as a solution. The programme adhered closely
to the principle espoused by other microfinance programmes, namely making timely
credit available to the poor. The distinctive feature of the programme was that it incor-
porated the existing rural banking network.
Since 1999, India has seen a phenomenal rise in number of self help groups being
formed and then linked to the conventional banking network under this programme.
There was been a ten fold increase between 1999 and 2004 in the number of groups
that have been linked by the SHG programme. (See Table 2)
3.2 Self Help Groups
The self help group starts life as a modified Rotating and Saving Credit Association
(mROSCA). The NGO is responsible for initiating the group and then nurturing it till
it matures. Once mature, the group is linked to external sources of credit by the NGO.
Since the group is initiated as a modified ROSCA, saving is imperative for every
member. Given a tightly repayment structure, how often a member chooses to bor-
row depends on his ability to service the repayments. It is, of course possible that
some members may choose not to borrow and just choose to participate in the group
as savers only.
As we discuss above, the SHG mechanism allows the savers to play a useful role in
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the group. They are able to augment the creditworthiness of the borrowers by their pres-
ence in the group. The dynamics of a self help group may, thus, be more complicated
as compared to a dynamics of a group composed solely of borrowers.
Each group is led by two group leaders. The group leader are meant to be elected
democratically from the group. We profile the group leaders and compare them to the
rest of the group members.
The way the incentive are structured, the NGO finds it optimal to give the group
leaders a fair amount of discretion. Even though, in principle, the group is supposed
to make all its decisions democratically, the leaders have a fair amount of discretion in
running the group. In the group meeting that I attended, I found that the group leader
lead the discussions and influenced most decisions made in the meeting.
For instance, themembers submit their demands for loans to the group at theweekly
meeting. The group is supposed to decide who get the loan after the discussion. We
found that these discussions were always led and often dominated by the group leader.
The group leaders also had more information than the rest because they were invari-
ably more educated than the rest and maintained the accounts. They also had more
information because they represented the group in discussions with the NGO and the
local bank.
It may be argued that under the SHG programme, the NGO virtually delegates the
task of running the group to the group leader. Thus, group leaders have ample oppor-
tunity to abuse their power, if they so wish.
3.3 Cost of Credit
The SHG Linkage Programme result in a long credit chain. There are more participants
in its credit chain as compared to microfinance programmes where the NGO under-
takes the financial intermediation. The NGO, the public bank and the self help group
are the significant participants in the credit chain.
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Chavan and Ramakumar (2005) contend that in the SHG Linkage Programme, the
practice of ”margin (being) charged by eachparticipant ... for covering transaction cost”
in the credit chain, has led to significantly ”higher cost of credit for the poor.”
Once the self help groups are ready to be linked, the NGO arranges the external
credit. These funds are then channeled to the self help group, which it then lends on to
its individual members. The NGO charges a margin for its role in linking the group. In
some cases, the self help group keeps a margin as well, which is then shared among all
the group members. The groups we studied in Haryana did not follow this practice.
The primary sources of credit areNABARDrefinanced loans from local public banks,
government lending programmes like the RashtriyaMahila Kosh (RMK) and loans from
government agencies like the National Minorities Development Finance Corporation
(NMDFC). At the time the study was undertaken, the NABARD’s prime lending rate of
was 6 per cent per annum.
We find that borrowing rate for group members was 24 per cent for internally fi-
nanced group loans and between 18 to 24 per cent for externally financed loans. The
groups was able to get the loans from RMK and NMDFC at 18% per annum. The NGO’s
margin was 6 per cent from RMK and 10 per cent from NMDFC sourced credit. In case
of credit from public banks, the rates were negotiated at the time the credit was ob-
tained.
According to Chavan and Ramakumar (2005), the cost of borrowing for SHG mem-
bers across the country is in the range of 24 to 36 per cent per annum. Most studies like
Harper (1998), Harper (2002), Gaiha (2001), Puhazhendi and Satyasai (2000) and Pu-
hazhendi and Badatya (2002) come to the same conclusions. Only in exceptional cases,
the cost of borrowing may be as high as 50 to 60 per cent per annum.
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4 Data
The fieldwork for this study took place in August 2004 in the tehsil of Hathin6 in the
Indian state of Haryana. The data was collected in the rural and urban area of Hathin.
We interviewed 58 members from 7 self help group in the area.
4.1 Lending Programme
The groups had been formed by Society of Promotion of Youth and Masses (SPYM),
a New Delhi based NGO working in the area for the last eight years. They manage
300 groups in the area, with a presence in all 84 villages of Hathin. SPYM works with
“women-only” groups and so all our interviewees were women. The groups had be-
tween 16 and 18 members each. The age of the groups ranged from 18 to 32 months.7
In our sample, two groups are from the the urban town of Hathin. The tehsil takes
its name from the name of the town. Even though the town of Hathin has virtually
no amenities that would in principle qualify it as a urban area, we found that it did
have significant inward migration from the nearby villages. The groups in the town of
Hathin were more varied in their backgrounds and ethnic identity than groups from
the surrounding villages. In contrast, groups from the surrounding villages were almost
homogenous in respect of ethnic and religious background.
In five groups of the seven groups, we were able to interview 7 or more members of
the group. Off these, in two groups we were to interview 14 members. In the remaining
two groups in the village of Kondal, we were no only able to interview 3members each.
Given that we were able to interview the group leaders, we use this information when
we compare the profile of the group leaders to the profile of group members. We were
able to interview 8 members from another group in the same village which had close
linkages with this group. Thus all these interviews put together tell us something useful
6The tehsil of Hathin is part of district Faridabad. For the purpose of administration, a state is divided
into districts which is divided further into tehsil.
7The focus of the study was on studying relatively young groups. The objective was to look at the dy-
namics in the early stages of group’s life.
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about the group leaders in that village. Of course, for group wise analysis, we use data
from only 54 interviews and exclude the two under-represented groups.
4.1.1 The Area
Hathin is in the semi-arid area in the south of Haryana. Wheat and mustard are the
main crops grown in the area. According to the Census held in 2001, Hathin has a pop-
ulation of 203,867 of which 94.65 percent lives in the rural area. The rural literacy rate
is 61.7 per cent among men and 23.75 per cent among women. The urban literacy rate
is higher at 83.28 per cent for men and 57.64 per cent for women.
Themain occupation inHathin is agriculture with 70.2 per cent ofmaleworkers and
84.2 per cent of female workers associatedwith agricultural sector. Of this, 33.6 per cent
of the female worker and 17.4 per cent of the male workers are agricultural labourers.
4.1.2 The Communities
Jats and the meos are the main communities in this area. Jats tend to be landowners
and are a relatively wealthy community. The meos are a poorer community and most
work as agriculural labourers.
Off the three villages we looked at, the groups members were all jats in village of
Kondal and allmeos in the villages of Guraksar andKhuluka. Kondal had no agricultural
labourers whereas Guraksar had 42.86 per cent and Khuluka had 85.71 per cent. In
Hathin, one group had 28.57 per cent and other group had no agricultural labourers.
(See Table 7)
4.1.3 Potential Investment Projects
There were number of dairies in the area which either exist as cooperatives or are pri-
vately owned. Thus, the residents of the area, have the requisite infrastucture in place,
which enables them to access the market with their dairy produce. Consequently, buf-
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falo seems to be themain class of assets that households in our sample own, apart from
land. In the interviews, when asked about owned assets, they were the two that were
mentioned in most cases.
A buffalo could cost anywhere between Rs 3,000 to 15,000. The more expensive the
buffalo, the more milk it produced per day. The milk could be sold to the local dairy
at anywhere between Rs 5 to Rs. 7 per litre. Even though there may be other viable
investment projects, the group members in our sample, without exception chose to
invest in buffalos. As we analyse in the section 7, the SHG lending mechanism restricts
the borrower’s range of investment projects to ones that have a very short gestation
period. The buffaloes suit this purpose given that the borrowers could buy buffaloes
that were able to produce milk from the day they were bought.
4.2 Fieldwork
The group members were interviewed in the location of the weekly meeting. We found
that the meeting were usually held at a group leader’s residence. We tried to follow-up
interviews with visit to the house. This was to visually confirm the information given
by the interviewee. With a few exceptions, in most cases the members let me into their
houses without any hesitation.
The interview tried to elicit responses regarding household income, household de-
mographics and participation or role of the respondent in the group. They were asked
about the usage of borrowed funds. They were also asked if played a role in the ensuring
that other group members fulfilled their financial responsibilities to the group. (See the
Questionnaire)
Since I had gained access to interviewee’s through the group’s parent NGO, in some
instances, the members were diffident about revealing their household’s financial situ-
ations. On such occasions, I tried to corroborate the information with help from other
group members.
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5 Results
5.1 Demographics
The typical members of in our sample study was young to middle aged with mean age
of 38.14 years. The husbands tended to be marginally older with a mean age of 38.93
years. The average size household was 6.44 with 3.91 dependents. An average of 3.96
children per woman, suggests that the typical member lived in a nuclear set up with
children as their main dependents. (See Table 6)
Themeanhousehold incomeper yearwasRs. 34,038. This varied significantly across
locations and groups. Off the two groups in the town of Hathin, Poornima8 was dis-
tinctly poorer than Shrikant with respective mean incomes of Rs. 23,714 and Rs 38,333.
Shrikant’smemberswere alsomore educated thanPoornimawith respectivemeanyears
of schooling of 4.38 and 2.29 years. This pattern held for the husbands from the two
groups as well. (See Table 6 and 7)
Aswementioned above, bothHathin groups Poornima and Shrikant hadbeen formed
simultaneously. The two groups had been initiated concomitantly by three groups ini-
tiators9. There maybe have been some self selection effects at play here with the better
educated and better off women grouping together in Shrikant. As we discuss in Section
6, with the inflexible and tight repayment structures prescribed in the SHGprogramme,
the poor womenmaybe perceived as risky in terms of being able to adhere to regular re-
payment. We interviewed both group at the same location under identical conditions.
Any systematic selection bias in our interviews should have identical impact on the two
groups.
There had been no problems with late repayment in the two groups. In 18 months
since the group was formed, Poornima has lent 14 times to itsmembers with an average
loan amount of Rs. 7,986. In the sameperiod, Shrikant has lent 15 timeswith an average
8Each group adopts a name which when it is formed and this name is used in all the paperwork to refer
to this group.
9see section 6.1.2 for a discussion on group initiators
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loan amount of Rs. 6,600.
In household income terms, Rahim (village Khuluka) was the worst off and Cha-
hat (village Kondal) best off with respective mean household incomes of Rs. 21,500 and
Rs.38750.
5.1.1 Education
In terms of the education, Shrikant (Hathin) was the most capable with a mean of 4.38
years of schooling whereas Rahim (Khuluka) was the least capable with 0.38 years of
education.
Overall the levels of education was dismal with ordinary member (excluding group
leader) having amean of 1.74 years of schooling. The ordinarymember’s spouse educa-
tion level was not much higher at 4.06 years of schooling. Compared to this, the group
leaders and spouses weremore educated than the rest of themembers. The group lead-
ers had an average of 7.5 and their husbands and a average 9.78 years of schooling. (Ta-
ble 6)
5.2 Group Leaders
The group leaders had a highermean income and formal education, aswell asmore ed-
ucated husband, as compared to rest of the group members. In four out of five groups,
they also obtained a large proportion of total group credit in its first 18 months of its
existence.
The mean household income for the group leaders and rest of the members was
Rs. 41,769 and Rs. 31,525 respectively. As mentioned above, groups leaders were more
educated than the rest of the members with 7.5 years schooling. Their husbands, with
9.78 years of education, were more educated as well. (Table 6)
The groups leaders, in all groups other than Chahat10, undertook a significant pro-
10Chahat group leaders told me that they were members of other older groups in the village and had
preferred to borrow from there because they could borrow larger amounts in the that group
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portion of total credit disbursed during the first 18months of group’s existence. In Sahil
they account for more than half and in Poornima and Rahim, more than a quarter of
the of total credit extended by the group. In Shrikant the group leaders obtained a little
more than a tenth of the total credit.
This is not surprising, given group leader’s higher incomes and thus, superior repay-
ment capability.11 Though, it does suggest a source of intra-group heterogeneity which
the literature in microfinance has as yet not addressed.
We know that the group leaders were also the group initiator. The preferential treat-
ment they get in obtaining credit maybe the members way of compensating them for
effort expended in forming the group. The only group where members seem dissat-
isfied and complained about the group leader was in Sahil. The group leaders in this
case had obtained 52.03% of total credit allocated. In my house visits, three members
complained that their demand for loan had been unfairly rejected.
It is difficult to determine whether this constitutes evidence of elite capture. It cer-
tainly suggests elite involvement in the process of group lending. In Sahil (Guraksar),
Mariam, the president of the group and Akhtari, the secretary of the group were both
daughter-in-laws of the village sarpanch (village head). Mariam also had two proxy
members in the group and she made the necessary financial contribution on their be-
half. She, along with other group leaders, had obtained 52.03 per cent of all credit ex-
tended by the group in the 18 months of its existence.
She was the person who had initiated the group. It is significant to note that in spite
of being unpopular among the group members, she had remained the leader and not
been changed. The possible explanation could be that, she played an critical role in
making the group viable. She wasmore educated than the rest and seemedmore adept
at dealing with the NGO than the rest of the group.
It is clear group leaders live in more educated household and thus are critical to
the group’s successful adoption of practices required to access the external sources of
11See Section 7.3.3
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credit. Agents from the respective external agencies are known to visit the NGO to in-
spect the accounts of the group before lending to a group for the first time. Credit is
sanctioned only if they are satisfied that the group has been transacting the internal
loans effectively.
5.3 Information Environment
In the villages, when asked about their peer’s activities, the members seemed very well
informed. In Khuluka,members claimed that they evenknew about each other’s house-
hold expenditure. This was not surprising given that, 12 of the 17 members belonged
to the same extended family. In other villages, they were aware of other member’s asset
holdings.
Most members live in proximity to each other. In the circumstances, once the bor-
rower had declared her intention in the weekly meetings, diverting the borrowed funds
would certainly not go unnoticed. The cost in terms of time and effort, for members to
verify the usage of the funds, would be negligible. It seemed difficult to divert even a
small portion of the funds without the consent of the group.
As discussed in section 4.1.3 and section 7.3 , the range of potential profitable invest-
ment projects is limited to buying buffaloes. Thus, there are just three or four discrete
options of buffalos types available to the borrower. Spending less than the borrowed
amount on a buffalo, given that most members were well aware of the buffalos types
and their respective cost, would not go unnoticed. With extensive knowledge members
display on types of buffalos available in the area, it would not be difficult monitor the
usage of borrowed funds.
The cost of monitoring is negligible in this context, not entirely due to the fact that
members belong to a tight-knit community. It is driven down by limiting the number of
potentially profitable projects (section 7.3) available to the borrower. If a member bor-
rowed for something radical, say buying a new innovative agricultural implement, like
of which had never before been seen in the community, conceivably then, monitoring
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the usage of funds would be muchmore costly12 and inefficient13.
In Hathin, even though the members were well acquainted with each other, they
were not privy to each others household expenditure or asset holdings. Very few mem-
bers interacted with each other beyond the weekly meetings. They did not seem aware
of each others credit needs or usage of borrowed funds.
In Poornima, a borrower confided in me that she had lied about the purpose of her
loanwhen she hadborrowed. She told the group that she needed a loan to buy a buffalo,
even though she needed it to invest in her husband’s shop. She claimed that she had
lied because it increased her chances of getting the loan.
The fact that no one had discovered that she had diverted her funds tells us that the
cost ofmonitoring the usage of funds is either not insignificant or she had colludedwith
members who may have monitored her inexpensively. Of course, since she has made
all her repayments on time, the group members had no opportunity to audit her.
5.4 Local Informal MoneyMarket
In our study, we asked self help group members, if they has participated in the local
informal and formal money market. Off 58 respondents, 24 said that they had and the
results are given in Table 9. Since, there is no perceptible relationship between the size
and the cost of the loans, in any of the categories, Table 9 reports unweighed means.
It must be noted the rates in this area, especially in the informal money market, are
quoted in permonths terms and not per year terms. This may be a convention followed
to make interest calculations easier for the borrowers. The respondents gave us per
month figures which we have converted to per year figures.
The cost of borrowing varied from 0% to 36%per annumand the amounts borrowed
varied from Rs. 1,000 to Rs 150,000. Relatives turn out to be the most abundant source
of credit with the mean borrowing of Rs. 37,889. This was least inexpensive category
12in terms of acquiring knowledge related to the new projects
13in terms of probability with which the monitor is able to discover the truth
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of credit at 9.8% per annum. All loans from the local money lender were at 36% per
annum.
The village of Kondal is an exception to the pattern, where the respondents had bor-
rowed relatively large amounts from the relatives. If we exclude the Kondal member’s
loans from their relatives, the range of remaining loans shrink to between Rs. 1000 and
Rs. 20,000.
The loans taken from the self help groups were in the range of the Rs. 1,000 and
Rs. 25,000 with most loans concentrated between Rs. 2,000 and Rs 10,000. The cost of
credit from the self help group, at 24% for internal loans and 18% for external loans, is
less expensive than the local money lender but more expensive than from the relatives.
Rawal andMukherjee (2005) conducted a survey to determine agricultural labourer’s
access to credit in two districts of the Haryana. They found that most of their subjects
had borrowed at either 24% or 36% per annum, which is line with our findings.
5.5 Group’s NetWorth
We compared total saving accumulated by the group14 with the total amount owed by
the group membersat any given point in time.
The idea was to identify the length of time it took for the group to be able to borrow
an amount greater than its accumulated saving pot. This the time when the lenders to
the group actually start taking a risk by lending to the group. This is also the time when
the group starts leveraging its accumulated saving (and its social capital) to actually
start borrowing as groups from the external credit agencies.
We found that the it took a average of 12.6 months for a group to reach a stage
where the total credit exceeded the total saving. Rahim (Khuluka) took the longest at
18 months and Shrikant (Hathin) took the shortest time at 8 months. Shrikant’s sister
group, Poornima took 12, Chahat (Kondal) took 15 and Sahil (Guraksar) took 10months.
14this did not include the interest income of the group
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5.6 Size of the Loans
Off the 77 loans taken in the five groups, 15 loans were less than Rs. 3,000 and 16 were
were greater than RS. 15,000. There were 44 medium sized loans with 21 loans between
Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 10,000 and 23 loan between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 15,000. (See Table 3)
The mean for the loans stood at Rs. 8555.84 with the median and mode at Rs. 10,000.
5.7 Responses on Social Sanction
When asked about the what actions the group would take if a member was late in her
payment, the initial reaction was defensive. They immediately started denying that
something like that has ever happened in their group.15 There was obviously some
pride associated with group’s ability to self-governs efficiently. The response in the first
instance was always muted.
On abit of persistent questioning, the group leaders becamemore forthcoming. The
said that they would encourage at first, but if that failed, would make repeated house
visits. When asked if theywould bring outside influence, like village elders, to bear upon
the delinquent members, the response on almost all occasions was an emphatic no.
We found that only one group had instated a penalty system for late payment. This
was the group Sahil in Guraksar where, as we reported earlier, the group leader Mariam
was very unpopular. A member was penalised Rs.10 a day, if she was either late in her
repayment or in depositing her monthly mandatory saving amount.
Though, there was variation in the response of other group members, none were as
emphatic as the group leaders. Some had rhetorical answers that resonated with the
community development officer post-meeting lecture every week. There were others,
who seemed less enthusiastic about getting involved in a spat with someone else in the
group. The only discernible pattern was the group leaders were a little more descriptive
as well as assertive in their responses as compared to the rest of the members.
15The particular response may be explained by the fact that group members had a lingering suspicion
that I was some kind of a auditor.
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5.8 Targeting
In the study, we try look for evidence ofNGO’s attempt to target the poor. The guidelines
of the programme do specify that the the NGO targets the poor. The NGO claimed that
it did not allow anymember of household that owned more than 11
2
acre of land to join
the group. We found no evidence that the NGO had tried to implement this principle in
practice.
There are reasons why explicit targeting may not have been optimal in the area cov-
ered by the NGO. The typical member of the group had minimal education. None, ex-
cept the group leaders, had the requisite education or numeracy skill required to main-
tain accounts for the group, operate its bank account and represent the group.
For linking the group to externally sourced credit, the NGOhas to satisfy the lending
agency that the group can administer itself efficiently. The lending agency satisfies itself
by scrutinising the accounts maintained by the groups. A representative from the self
help group also has to operate a bank account in one of the local bank branches. The
group leaders had the requisite educational skills to carry out these tasks.
By being part of the group, the group leaders are able to use their skills for the ben-
efits of the group and increase the group’s “effective literacy.” Basu and Foster (1998)
define the concept of “effective literacy” as ameasure that takes into account the “intra-
household externality arising from the presence of a literatemember” in the household.
In this case, it is the intra-group externality arising from the presence of a numerate per-
son in the group.
This gives us another reason why group lending may be optimal for lending to the
poor. It is an efficient mechanism to share literacy and numeracy amongst the poor,
which along with being scarcest resource amongst the poor, is also the critical resource
needed to uplift the poor.
We find that, in our study, the economically better off group leaders were also the
group initiators. If an explicit attempt was made to strictly target the poor, the group
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leaders would not be able to join the group.
Further, if the NGO was obliged to exclude them, then the cost of micro-managing
the group would have to be borne by the NGO. This would not only include provid-
ing the requisite support for the group to maintain its accounts but also facilitating the
group’s representatives’ interaction with the local bank. This would ensure that form-
ing groups, amongst the poor in the present area, would become non-viable under the
present system of financial incentives.
5.9 Elite Capture
In the study, we find that the groups have a mix of better-off and poor women in the
group. It is significant that the better off occupy the leadership positions. The relevant
question is whether group lending arrangement, encouraged by the SHG Programme,
is susceptible to “elite capture.”16
In a recent study in Kenya, Kremer and Gugerty (2004) finds that funding the local
disadvantaged women’s organisation started changing the group’s composition. The
groups started attracting young, better-educated and more capable women into the
group. Further, men and these better educated women moved into the key leadership
positions, thus weakening the role of the disadvantaged within the group itself.
On the surface, it would seem that we observe something similar in our study. The
better educated take up the leadership positions in the group and dominate the process
within the group. The subtle difference is that in this case, the better off seem to develop
a client-patron relationship with the poor in the group.
Each group has only two better-off and better-educated womenwho lead the group.
The leaders, while forming the group, seem to ensure that they were the only ones with
the superior educational skills in the group. This maybe be to put themselves in the
best position to extract rent from the rest of the group. The rent could take the form
of preferential treatment in obtaining credit in the group or some other form of side
16This is with the proviso that the study was extremely limited in extent
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payment in cash or kind.
Elite capture of the groups is prevented by a combination of two factors. The first
one being that the terms of credit available through the self help group is comparable
to the terms available in the informal market. The second factor is that it takes a long
period, almost a year, for the group to graduate to loans of amount thatmay interest the
elite within the village. The effort required may not square off with the benefits. Simi-
larly, the opportunity to save would have been lucrative to the elite if members saved a
significant amount per month. In this case, the mandatory monthly saving was a little
more than the daily wage of an agricultural labourer. Thus, the only relatively better-
off women in the group were the group leaders. These women were only marginally
better-off as compared to the rest of the group.
6 Mechanism of Institution Building
As mentioned above, the SHG linkage programme effectively separates the roles of in-
stitution building and financial intermediation. The NGO undertakes the process of
institutions building and the public banking network undertakes the financial inter-
mediation.
The NGO, initiates the process of group formation. Once the groups is formed, it
is nurtured by the NGO. Once the group matures, the NGO links these group to the
sources of credit through the public banks. By saving and borrowing through the public
banks, the group are able to generate a credit history. The public bank is then free to
expand the range of financial services it offers the group.
6.1 Group Formation
TheNABARDguidelines suggest that the group should have between 15 to 20members.
There are no laid down rules that the NGO is obliged to adhere to in forming a group. A
NGO is free to initiate the process of the group formation in any part of the country. As
25
we see below, there are built-in incentives in the programme to encourage the NGO to
form groups across the country.
The NGO in Hathin had assigned a community development officer for each village
in the tehsil. Once the decision to form a group had been made, the officer initiated a
dialogue with women in the village. In their interviews, the community development
officers said that their effort was to find the key person in the village who would under-
take the initiative required to form a group.
The NGO said that they tried to form groups that were homogenous and cohesive.
In reality, the local person, who takes the initiative, has fair amount of the discretion in
creating the group. We found that, in most groups, even though most members used to
lived fairly close to each other, there were always a fewmembers who lived a significant
distance away. These members were, without, exception, related or socially connected
to the person initiating the group.
6.1.1 the Poor
The NGO stressed that their objective was to target the poor. The NGO claimed that it
excluded households that owned more than 11
2
acre of land from joining the group. We
found that the NGO had made no effort to verify the land holdings of group members
or their household. There were 6members in our sample who ownedmore than 11
2
acre
of land in our sample. Given that the community development officer was frequently
present during the interview, there may have been under-reporting in this regard.
6.1.2 The Group Initiator
To identify the group initiators in the group, we asked each interviewee to specify how
they had found out about the group. In the town of Hathin, the two group, Poornima
and Shrikant, had been initiated simultaneously. Both started functioning as groups on
the same the day in February 2002. Mantosh, Kamlesh and Shimla were joint initiators
of the two groups. We found the almost everyone in the group said that they knew one
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or more of them and were asked by them to join the group. These three went on to
became key functionaries in their respective groups.
Similarly inmeo village of the Guraksar we found thatMairiam, the daughter-in-law
of the Sarpanch (head of the village) was the key person, who had initiated the group.
In Sahil, the group initiated by Mariam in Guraksar, 7 out of 16 members were closely
related to her. The group included Mariam’s 14 year old unmarried17 daughter and her
18 year old daughter-in-law. When pressed by me, Mariam conceded these two were
only passivemembers in the group and she used tomake the financial contribution on
their behalf.
In the jat village of Kondal, the respondents said that the group has been initiated
jointly by the local community development officer and the owner of amilk dairy in the
area. Given that that members frequently borrowed for the purpose of buying buffalos,
the dairy-owner’s incentive in initiating the group may have been to augment his milk
supply from the village.
In meo village of Khuluka, all respondents of the group Rahim said that that they
had been contacted by the local community development officer. In this group, 12 of
the 17 members of the group belonged to same extended family.
6.2 The Nurturing Phase
Once the group has been formed, it enters thenurturing phase. This is the critical phase
of institution building where the NGO encourages the group to develop group specific
rules which would help them administer themselves in the future. Since failures in the
initial stages can be fatal, the groups start with some simple rules regarding saving. The
group moves into the borrowing and repayment phase after 6 months.
FromNGO’s perspective, in the nurturing phase, the NGO invests resources into the
group without any returns. The NGO bears the cost of frequent visits from the commu-
nity development officer. The NGO is able to obtain returns on its investment only if
17she was the only unmarried person in our sample
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the group matures. To be more specific, the NGO gets its returns only if it is able to link
the group to external credit lines.
The self help groups adopts a name once it is formed and all its accounts are main-
tained under this name. The group meets once a week to discuss its affairs. Group’s
first task is to decide on the group leaders. There are two two key functionaries in the
group, the president (adhyaksha) and the secretary (sachiv) of the group. We refer to
them collectively as group leaders.
6.2.1 Role of Group Leaders
The role of the group leaders is loosely defined as someone who undertakes the respon-
sibility of ensuring that the group functions efficiently. In practical terms, the group
leaders help conduct the meetings, resolve disputes, maintain accounts and operate
the group’s bank account at the local public bank on behalf of the group.
In our sample of of 58, the ordinarymembers had an average of 1.74 years of school-
ing or formal educationwhere as the group leaders had anaverageof 7.5 years of school-
ing. Similarly, the husbands of the ordinary members in the sample had an average of
4.06 years of schooling where as the leader’s husbands had 9.78 years of schooling. (See
Table 6)
Someone in the group needs to undertake the responsibility of maintaining the ac-
counts. Even though, it is not one of the prescribed task of the group leaders we found
that the group leaders had taken on the responsibility of maintaining the accounts.
The person who maintains the account has easy access to all the financial informa-
tion of the group. Given the average level of numeracy, in the event of a dispute within
the group, the accountant’s interpretation of the financial information maybe crucial.
The accountant can, if she can exert leverage over other members of the group. One of
the conceivable ways in the which the accountant can exploit this leverage within the
group is by getting a preferential treatment in obtaining credit from the group.
The group opens an account in the nearest branch of a public bank after it has been
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formed. The account is opened by the group leaders on behalf of the group. The two
group leaders automatically become the two signatories for the bank account.
As evidence of power the group leader wields in the group, we found an instance
where a group members had been excluded after the group has been formed, at the
group leader’s insistence. In the group Chahat (village Kondal) we found that a relative
of the group leader (secretary), had been excluded from the group a few months after
the group had started. When I questioned the secretary of the group, she admitted that
she fallen outwith her relative around the time the relative had excluded from the group
and played a part in the getting her excluded from the group. This was corroborated by
three other members of the group.
6.2.2 Turnover of the Group Leaders
The group is free to decide on group leaders and the NGO suggests that groups change
their leaders every year. In our sample, we found that no group had changed its leader-
ship1819. We found that at least in one of the five groups, there was significant dissatis-
faction with the leadership. Mariam, the group president of Sahil (village Guraksar) was
very unpopular with the group. Yet there has been no move to attempt to dislodge her
from the position.
Given that the group leaders were more educated than the rest of the group mem-
bers, they may be playing a critical role in group by sharing their ability to maintain ac-
counts and deal with the outside agencies on behalf of the group. It was clear from our
sample that the average group member was hardly educated with 1.74 years schooling
and incapable of dealing with the bank directly or maintain accounts. it may be argued
that one of the important roles that groups play is optimally sharing the most scarce
skill among the impoverished, that of literacy and numeracy.
18It may be noted that the local public bank branches dislike change in group leadership since it requires
them to change the signatories for a group.
19Being a signatory for the group bank account entails travelling to the bank at a regular frequency. When
asked, most members said that they would be reluctant in undertaking this task.
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6.2.3 Saving
Eachmember of the group deposits a fixed amount in the saving pot of the group every
month. The mandatory monthly saving is determined before the group starts. Three
groups has mandatory saving of Rs 50 and one of Rs. 100 per month. Sahil (village Gu-
raksar) has startedwith Rs 50 permonth but changed to Rs 100 permonth from January,
2004. Assuming a 6 day working week, the average per working day income of house-
holds in our sample is Rs 109.10. In the sample, we did not come across any instance
of members being late in their deposits. All the members in the sample had been ex-
tremely regular in depositing. This is because of the strong enforcement mechanism
which we discuss in section 7.
According to the SPYM accounts, off the 300 group, 97 per cent of the groups had
never had any problems of members being late in either depositing their savings or
repaying their loans. In the rest there has been late payments but no known instance
of default at either individual or group level. The only instances of group default was in
1996, when the NGO had initially started forming groups in the area. Since 1997, there
was no instance of default.
Given the minimal level of schooling among the members and the range of ages (55
to 14 years in the sample), the simple practice of saving a fixed amount every month is
easily graspedby even the least intellectually capablemember of the group. This feature
of ROSCA has made it an enduring institution down the ages and the SHG programme
has successfully incorporated this feature in its mechanism.
6.2.4 Borrowing Internal Funds
Unlike ROSCAs, the SHGLinkage Programme encourage the groups towait a fewmonths
before allowing its members to borrow from the the saving pot. Though, the SPYM ad-
vises its groups to wait for six month before it starts lending within the group, we found
a fair amount of variation in the sample. Table 4 shows us that the five groups started
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lending in the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventhmonth respectively.
On the average, the first loan was given out 4 months and second loan 5.6 months
after the group started saving. This is in spite of the fact that the groups had surplus
funds in their saving pot to lend during this period. Rather, we found that the groups
total savings exceeds total borrowing for an average of 12.6months. The group typically
started by lending to one member. The number of borrowers increased very gradually.
An average of 1.6 borrowers had borrowed after six months and after nine months this
had gone up to just 3.4. An average 31.25 % and 55.66 % of group members had bor-
rowed (sourced internally or externally) from the group after twelve months and eigh-
teenmonths of group formation.
This sequential allocation of credit ensures that the members waiting in queue for
creditmonitor the present borrower intensively and internalise the cost of thismonitor-
ing. They not only monitor the usage of borowed funds, they also audit the borrowers
in case the borrower express inability to meet her repayment timely.
6.2.5 Repayment
The loan has to be repayed back in tenmonths in ten installments. the borrower repays
back one tenth of the principal plus the interest accrued on the portion of the principal
owed in each installment. So, if the borrower takes a loan of L his repayment in month
twould be [ 1
10
+ 10−t
10
· r] · L.
The interest rates vary according to the source of the credit. Group’s internal funds
are lent out at 24 per cent per annum where as funds from RMK and NMDFC are lent
out at 18 per cent per annum. The interest rates on loans that local branches of public
banks extend to the groups are in a similar range and are negotiated in each instance.
If a members borrows Rs 5,000 from the group, her first monthly installment would
be Rs 600 and each subsequent installment would be Rs 10 less than the last one till she
pays off the loan in the tenth month. So, unless the investment starts giving a return of
Rs 20 per day from the first month, the borrower would have to divert resources to pay
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her installments.
In Rahim, which was the poorest group we looked, the mean monthly income of Rs
1791.66. Given that the first installment is almost a third of mean monthly income20,
it is evident the range of profitable projects for a member of this group is limited to
ones that start bringing in immediate returns. Any project with a gestation period is
not viable for a income-poor borrower in this programme.
Apart fromborrowing tomeet an emergency expenditure, themost commonlymen-
tioned purpose for borrowing was to buy a buffalo. For a income-poor borrower, the
advantage of investing in a buffalo is that there is virtually no gestation period and the
buffalo starts producing milk almost immediately. The tightly structured repayment
structure rules out any investment opportunity with a significant gestation period for
the income-poor borrowers in the programme.
6.3 Maturity
If the group survives the saving and lending phase, the NGO starts the process of link-
ing the group to external sources of credit. By being able self govern itself through the
nurturing phase, the group proves its creditworthiness.
In this phase, the NGO links the group to external credit. Even though the credit
that ensues is for specific individual members, the lending is done through the group.
The external credit agency lends to self help group, which in turn, lends it on to the
individual member. Similarly, the repayment is made in each instance from the group
account and the individual members pays into the group account. As we discuss in
section 7, this allows the group to have full and immediate joint liability.
The whole group as a whole held responsible in case of delayed payment or default.
The repayment amount is deducted, everymonth, automatically from the group’s bank
account every month and in case of a delayed repayment, the group is left to deal with
20The mean monthly income of members (excluding group leaders) is Rs 2627.08. The first installment
of Rs 600 is 22.83 % of the mean monthly income.
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the situation internally. We found that the group Sahil (village Guraksar) had instituted
a late fee of Rs 10, though this was not a practice followed in any other group.
6.4 NGO’s Incentives
When NGO channels the credit from an external source to the group, it is able to keep a
margin. The margin gives NGO the requisite incentive to form groups and guide them
through their nurturing phase.
For SPYM in Hathin the two main sources of external credit were Rashtirya Mahila
Kosh (RMK)andNationalMinorities Development FinanceCorporation (NMDFC). RMK,
a government lending programme,makes credit available to theNGOat 6%per annum.
We found that the group members pay 18% per annum on loans from RMK and the
NGO keeps a margin of 12% on repayments. Similarly, the group borrowers pay 18%
on credit from NMDFC and the NGO’s is allowed to keep 10% of that. For every credit
source, NGO’s margin is clearly prescribed by the lending agency. This margin is the
only compensation the NGO gets for its efforts in forming and nurturing groups.
The group maintains its own account with the local bank and the credit is made
available through this account. Thus, the NGO cannot obtain a larger margin for itself
than prescribed by the lending agency. Of course, it still does not stop the NGO from
demanding further rents from the groups. If there are enough NGOworking in the area,
themonopolistic competition would drive tend to drive down these rents. In our study,
we did not observe explicit evidence of NGO extracting rents from the groups in returns
for making credit available.
In the SHG Linkage Programme, the NGO has no incentive to target the poor or
prevent elite capture. Given the incentive scheme, theNGO’s optimal strategy is to form
and nurture groups with minimum number of visit from the community development
officer. Consequently, the NGO finds it optimal to virtually sub-contract the process of
group formation to the group initiators. The features in the programme that prevent
elite capture is the length of time it takes for the group to graduate to maturity and
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relatively restricted opportunity to save.
7 Solving the Information Problems
In this section we look at the distinctive features of the SHG linkage programme. Even
though, it shares featureswith other othermicro finance programmes, the use ofmROSCA
as a base for group formation makes it distinctive and gives it a distinctive edge in solv-
ing the information problems. In this section we discuss, the way in which the SHG
programme deals with the information problems like adverse selection, moral hazard
and auditing.
7.1 Joint Liability
The SHGmechanism allows the NGO to use the the group’s accumulated saving imple-
menting full and immediate joint liability among the group members. If a particular
borrower fails to adhere to the strict repayment structure set out by the NGO, the group
members are immediately and fully penalised in this mechanism.
The saving accumulated due to the mandatory monthly savings is deposited in the
local branch of the public bank . Every month the repayment amount due is deducted
from the this account automatically. It is the responsibility of the group to ensure that
the borrowers meet their repayment obligations and that these repayments are de-
posited into the group’s bank account. We were told by the NGO in Hathin, that 97% of
the repayment were made on time according to the accounts maintained by the group.
In the 7 groups we looked at, there has never been any reported instance of a late pay-
ment.
In conventional group composed solely of borrowers, imposing joint liability on the
group members is not trivial. It has been argued that the NGO is able to impose joint
liability in effect by threatening to penalise the whole groups for one or more mem-
bers’ late payment or default. This penalty is baring the groups access to future credit.
34
Ghatak and Guinnane (1999, pg. 214) illustrate with an example from the Grameen
Bank’s lending practice. ”All borrowers accept the threat that if their group does not
fully repay its loans, then all members are cut off from future credit from this lender.”
Given that, with the SHG, joint liability bites with certainty and in the present pe-
riod, it ensures that members try their best to group with individuals that are reliable. It
further serves to sharpen themember’s incentives tomonitor and audit21 the borrower.
7.2 Active Screening
The nurturing phase gives the Community Development Officer (CDO) the opportu-
nity to observe the functioning of the group before deciding whether it wants to link the
group to external sources of credit. The conduct of the weekly group meeting conveys
important information about group’s social cohesion. This and other relevant informa-
tion collated by the CDO helps the NGO assess the future prospects of the group.
Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) classify this kind of screening as a active screening as it ”en-
tails lenders (a) expending resources in actively screening applicants (groups) ... and (b)
limiting the range of their lending activity tomembers of a particular kinship group, res-
idents of a given region or individuals with whom they trade.” This kind of screening is
distinct from passive screening mechanismwhich works though the design of contracts
(interest rate and loan size) and encourages the borrower or groups to self select.
Given that theNGOdoes not act purely like a financial intermediary, it does not have
full control on the terms of contract it offers the groups. Consequently, it is constrained
in its ability to screen the groups passively through self selection. The lending rates are
set either by the government lending agencies like the RMKandNMFDCat theNational
level or by the respective public banks. The NGO does have a slightly greater, though
not full control, over the size of the loans to be offered to the groups, once they has
mature.
21Monitoring here entails monitoring the usage of borrowed fund before the output is realised. Auditing
is undertaken to verify the veracity of borrower’s claim about the value of the output, after the output has
been produced
35
In our study, we observed the NGO undertaking the cost associated with active
screening. I frequently accompanied the community development officers in their visit
to groups that were being nurtured. Each such visit would almost take 3 hours or more.
The CDO would mainly observe the weekly meeting, interrupting only to clarify rules
regarding accounting and saving. The CDOs tended to address the meeting at the end,
to convey to the group that their future access to credit hinged crucially on their ability
to efficiently self govern through the next fewmonths.
Further as Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) suggest in (b), the NGO, by tying-in the groups
with a mandatory saving scheme, encourages the formation of group (or cements a
pre-existing group) on which it intends to concentrate its future lending activity.
With a mROSCA, the resources expended in screening actively are significantly less
than it would be in its absence. Specifically, the CDO is able to gather information
merely by attending successive weekly meetings and examining the accounts main-
tained by the group. ThemROSCAs enable NGO to observe the prospective group, for a
period of time, at a nominal cost before committing to link the group.
It is well documented that the NGO, as an outsider, has a disadvantage in cost of ac-
quiring local information as compared to the various participants in the local informal
markets. Adding the ROSCAs element to the conventional micro finance model is an
invaluable innovation, as it allows the NGO to partially mimic the way the local mon-
eylender acquires information in the local informal market. It also allows the groups to
exhibit their ability to administer themselves as a financial entity. The only the groups
that are able to develop rules and draw upon the requisite social connections are able
to survive through the nurturing stage. The group that are weak or show lack of cohe-
siveness do not make past the nurturing stage.
7.3 Monitoring
The are are number of ways in which the SHG Linkage Programme group arrangement
is able to induce monitoring. The instrument that encourages monitoring vary accord-
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ing to the stages of life.
7.3.1 Sequential Borrowing inmROSCA
There is a moratorium on lending for approximately the first six months. The lending
start after that very gradually. The limited amount of saving, given the small mandatory
monthly saving each member makes, ensures that the groups lends sequentially with
the group deciding the sequence in which the borrowers get credit.
Thus both the borrowers that are waiting for credit and those in not in the queue
have incentives to monitoring and audit the present the borrower(s). Not only are they
impatient to ensure that they get a chance to borrow, their accumulated saving is jeop-
ardised if the present borrow does not repay on time or defaults. With the full and im-
mediate joint liability that SHG mechanism encompasses, the non-borrowers in the
group have a strong incentive to ensure that the borrowers repay back on time.
7.3.2 Tightly Structured Repayment
The repayments in SHG linkage programme, like most micro finance schemes, are very
tightly structured with members required to repay the loan fully in 10 months.
Jain and Mansuri (2003, pg. 255) note that this ”limits the types of projects that
can be financed with micro-credit loans” and ”long-gestation projects ... are difficult
to finance solely by loans for which repayments begin long before the returns from
the project are realised.” (ibid) They suggest that the widespread use of these tightly
structured repayment schedules is to encourage the borrowers to repay by borrowing
from the informal sector. According to them, this allows microfinance institutions to
incorporate the superior monitoring technology of the informal sector in monitoring
the borrowers.
In our study, we found, as reported above, interest rates in the informal sector, though
higher, were comparable to the rates at whichmembers borrow through the group. Fur-
ther, we did not find evidence that the group members were active participant in the
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informal sector once they had joined the group. Table 9 shows that in our sample of
the 58, only 7 interviewees reported that they had borrowed from the moneylender in
the recent past. Relatives seem to be the largest source of credit with 14 interviewees
reported to have borrowed from a relative at a average interest rate of 9.8 per cent per
annum. There were 6 instances of borrowing from the acquaintances and public banks
each at 20.4 and 31 per cent per annum respectively. Further, the average size of loan
from relatives was much higher as compared to the other sources of loans.
A tightly structured repayment may be used to restrict the number of simultane-
ous borrowers in the group borrowing simultaneously, at any given point in time. This
curtails the demand for credit andwould obviously imply a lower number of simultane-
ous borrowers in a group. Specifically, by restricting the choice of potentially profitable
projects that may be undertaken by the borrower, it lowers the demand for credit and
thus reduces the frequency requests for credit at any given point in time.
7.3.3 Restricting the Number of Borrowers
In our sample we found that no more than a third of the group has loans outstanding,
at any given time. The group, as a whole, bears the responsibility of ensuring timely
repayment by individual borrowers. As we elaborated in Section 7.1, the group is jointly
liable, for any loans undertaken by an individual member of the group.
With joint liability, the threat of losing their accumulated savings, gives the peers
incentives to monitor the borrower and thus ensure that the loaned funds are used ju-
diciously and repayments are made on time. Peers also have the incentives to audit the
borrower, if the borrower declares inability to meet her repayment obligations.
Restricting the number of borrowers who borrow simultaneously, sharpens these
incentives even further for the group since at any given point in time, these incentives
are sharper for a non-borrowers i as compared to a member j who has borrowed.
Member j has comparatively less to lose if another borrower defaults and the group
collapses. By declaring default, hemay have a good chance of escaping repayment obli-
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gations. Conversely, if the group a borrower repays late or defaults, member i would
loose part of her saving as well as access to future credit. Thus, the non-borrower mem-
ber imonitors and audit her peers more diligently than the borrower j.
Thus, measures that dampens the demand for credit and reduces the number of
simultaneous borrowers in the group induces greater amount of aggregate monitoring
in the group.
8 Conclusion
The objective of this exercise was to minutely look at the working of a particular micro-
finance operator. We set out the programme, as it has been designed at the national
level in India. We look at the incentive structures laid out in the programme for the
NGOs andmicrofinance operators to fulfill the gap in rural financial markets across the
country. We found that by incorporating the national banking network, the programme
unbundles financial intermediation from the process of institution building. This allow
the NGO to specialise in process of institution building.
We looked at the innovative way in which the programme uses a modified form
ROSCA to effectively screen the groups, implement full and immediate joint liability
and involve the savers in the process of the group lending. We also analysed how this
allows the group to solve the information problems associated with lending to the im-
poverished more effectively.
The programme allows the poor to not just borrow but also to be able to get some
returns from the process of financial intermediation. Thus, it gives the poor a valuable
instrument to save.
We found that in the programme, members borrow atmarginally lower rate as com-
pared to the informal money market in the area. It also allows them an opportunity to
save. We found that there was considerable variation in the cost of acquiring informa-
tion between rural and urban communities.
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We looked at the demographics of the borrower. The groups were led by group lead-
ers that were economically better off andmore educated than the rest of the group. The
ordinarymembers hadminimal educational skills. Thus, we found that education is the
scare resource among the impoverished in Hathin. One of the benefits of group lending
is that it increases the “effective literacy” of the group. Essentially, it gives a number of
less educated individuals the benefits of sharing the educational skill of the few in the
group.
We also found that the group leaders weremore active in terms of borrowing. Given
the strict structured repayment structure, being economically better-off also means
that being able to borrow more. We looked at the problem of elite capture and found
that this particular group lending programme did not seem to have any significant risk
of elite capture. Restriction on the saving and time the group takes to graduate to large
loans act as deterrents for elite capture.
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Table 1: Rural Bank in India
Rural Bank Offices Rural Credit Rural Deposits
Year Number Growth % of total % of total % of total
1975 7,112.00 10.3 35.5 6.0 8.5
1976 8,588.00 20.8 36.6 6.4 8.7
1977 10,856.00 26.4 40.3 7.2 9.4
1978 12,534.00 15.5 42.5 8.4 10.1
1979 14,171.00 13.1 44.0 9.3 11.4
1980 16,111.00 13.7 46.9 10.7 12.6
1981 19,453.00 20.7 51.2 11.9 13.4
1982 21,626.00 11.2 53.0 12.5 14.2
1983 23,782.00 10.0 52.4 13.6 14.4
1984 25,541.00 7.4 52.9 13.5 13.4
1985 29,408.00 15.1 54.6 14.1 13.6
1986 29,700.00 1.0 55.7 14.5 14.0
1987 30,585.00 3.0 56.2 15.3 14.7
1988 31,641.00 3.5 56.2 15.3 14.7
1989 33,572.00 6.1 57.3 14.8 15.0
1990 34,867.00 3.9 58.2 14.2 15.5
1991 35,134.00 0.8 56.9 15.0 15.5
1992 35,254.00 0.3 56.8 15.1 15.1
1993 35,360.00 0.3 56.3 14.1 15.0
1994 35,396.00 0.1 55.9 14.0 15.2
1995 33,017.00 -6.7 51.7 11.9 13.7
1996 32,981.00 -0.1 51.2 11.4 14.4
1997 32,909.00 -0.2 50.5 11.4 14.7
1998 32,854.00 -0.2 49.9 11.4 14.5
1999 32,840.00 0.0 49.3 11.0 14.7
2000 32,673.00 -0.5 48.7 10.6 14.7
2001 32,640.00 -0.1 48.3 10.1 14.7
2002 32,443.00 -0.6 47.8 10.2 14.2
Source: Ramachandran and Swaminathan (2005)
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Table 2: SHG Bank linkage Programme
SHGs Financed Bank Loan (Rs. crore)
Year Number Growth Cumm. Amount Growth Cumm.
1992-1999 32,995 32,995 57 57
1999-2000 81,780 148% 114,775 136 138% 193
2000-2001 149,050 82% 263,825 288 112% 481
2001-2002 197,653 33% 461,478 545 89% 1026
2002-2003 255,882 29% 717,360 1,022 87% 2049
2003-2004 361,731 41% 1079,091 1,855 81% 3904
Source: Government of India, Economic Survey, 2003-04
£1.00 = Rs. 79; Rs 1 Crore = Rs 10 million
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Table 3: Distribution of Loans
Loan Number
Amount of Loans
0 - 999 0
1,000 - 1,999 3
2,000 - 2,999 12
3,000 - 4,999 8
5,000 - 9,999 13
10,000 - 14,999 23
15,000 - 19,000 14
20,000 - 25,000 2
Mean 8,555.84
(643.62)
Median 10,000
Mode 10,000
std. error in brackets
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Table 4: GroupMembers that have Borrowed at least once
Months Poornima Shikant Sahil Rahim Chahat
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 1 0 3
5 0 1 1 0 5
6 1 1 1 0 5
7 1 1 1 3 5
8 2 2 1 3 5
9 2 5 1 4 5
10 2 5 1 5 5
11 3 6 3 5 5
12 4 7 5 5 5
13 7 8 5 6 5
14 9 8 5 6 5
15 9 8 5 8 6
16 10 8 5 8 9
17 10 9 7 8 9
18 11 10 7 8 10
Total Membership 16 17 17 17 16
Average wait for first loan: 4 months after group formation
Average wait for second loan: 5.6 months after group formation
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Table 5: Group Leaders Proportion of Total Borrowing
(after 18 months of group formation)
Total Average per Group Leaders’ Group Leaders’
Borrowing Borrower Borrowing Proportion
Sahil 135,500 16,938 70,500 52.03%
Poornima 107,800 9,800 30,000 27.83%
Rahim 28,000 3,500 7,500 26.79%
Shrikant 99,000 9,000 10,500 10.16%
Chahat 65,000 5,458 2,000 1.16%
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Table 6: Demographics
All Members excl. Group Leaders
Members Group Leaders only
Sample Size 58 44 14
Members’ Age 34.14 35.05 31.29
(9.20) (10.12) (4.56)
Husband’s Age 38.93 39.67 36.71
(10.26) (10.77) (8.55)
Household income 34,038 31,525 41,769
(21,855) (21,181) (22,935)
(per capita) 5,928 5,430 7,460
(4,200) (3,998) (4,597)
Years of Formal Education
members 2.92 1.74 7.50
(3.99) (3.20) (3.54)
husband 5.23 4.06 9.78
(4.71) (4.51) (1.92)
Household Size 6.44 6.51 6.21
(2.41) (2.48) (2.22)
No. of dependents 3.91 3.81 4.21
(2.51) (2.60) (2.29)
Children
Total 3.96 3.95 4.00
(2.05) (2.10) (1.96)
Female 1.79 1.91 1.43
(1.46) (1.59) (0.94)
Male 2.14 2.10 2.29
(1.29) (1.27) (1.38)
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Table 7: Group-wise Demographics
Poornima Shrikant Sahil Chahat Rahim
Total membership 16 17 17 16 17
Sample size 7 9 14 8 14
Agriculutural labourers 2 0 6 0 12
(28.6%) (42.9%) (85.7%)
Members’ Age 34.43 32.56 34.21 40.63 33.50
Husband’s Age 39.00 39.44 39.67 44.13 38.14
Household income 23,714 38,333 39,364 38,750 21,500
(per capita) 6,021 7,511 6,548 7,097 2,992
Years of Formal Education
members’ 2.29 4.38 2.25 2.13 0.38
husbands’ 4.67 8.56 1.44 5.50 2.50
Size of house hold 4.43 6.33 6.62 6.88 6.79
no. of dependents 2.29 4.33 4.69 2.75 3.92
Children
Total 2.57 4.22 4.15 3.88 4.43
Female 1.14 2.00 2.08 1.63 1.93
Male 1.67 2.22 2.08 2.25 2.50
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Table 8: Locality-wise Demographics
Hathin Guraksar Kondal Khuluka
Sample Size 16 14 14 14
Members’ Age 33.40 34.21 35.57 33.50
(7.94) (10.12) (10.12) (9.76
Husband’s Age 39.20 39.67 38.71 38.14
(10.05) (9.53) (11.74) (10.99
Household income 33,067 39,364 43,000 21,500
(14,552) (29,107) (22,891) (16,206
(per capita) 7,066 6,548 6,891 2,992
(4,3213) (5,320) (3,789) (1,938
Years of Formal Education
members’ 2.93 2.25 4.43 0.38
(4.30) (2.99) (4.64) (1.06
husbands’ 7.00 1.44 7.67 2.50
(4.31) (2.96) (3.92) (4.63)
Household size 5.60 6.62 7.00 6.79
(2.38) (2.81) (2.57) (1.76
No. of dependents 3.47 4.69 3.71 3.92
(2.56) (2.75) (2.70) (2.18
Children
Total 3.53 4.15 3.86 4.43
(2.10) (2.15) (2.32) (1.79
Female 1.60 2.08 1.57 1.93
(1.84) (1.38) (1.45) (1.21
Male 2.07 2.08 2.00 2.50
(1.14) (1.32) (1.30) (1.45
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Table 9: Informal Money Market in Hathin
All Locality / Villages
Borrowed from: Hathin Guraksar Kondal Khuluka
Moneylender 7 3 2 0 2
Avg. amount (Rs.) 4,625 6,250 1,000 5,000
max 10,000 1,000 5,000
min 2,500 1,000 5,000
Avg. interest rate 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0
Relative 14 5 1 4 2
Avg. amount (Rs.) 37,889 12,000 10,000 73,250 2,000
max 20,000 10,000 150,000 2,000
min 6,000 10,000 35,000 2,000
Avg. interest rate 9.8 9.0 0.0 12.0 12.0
Acquaintance 6 0 2 3 0
Avg. amount (Rs.) 5,000 5,000 5,000
max 5,000 5,000
min 5,000 5,000
Avg. interest rate 20.4 0.0 34.0
Bank 6 4 0 1 0
Avg. amount (Rs.) 10,750 5,000 28,000
max 5,000 28,000
min 5,000 28,000
Avg. interest rate 31.0 33.6 18.0
note: 24 out of 58 interviewees said that they had participated in the informal money market
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Questionnaire
Table 10: Questionnaire used in the Hathin Casestudy
1. Individual No.
2. Name:
3. Village:
4. Caste:
5. Name of SHG:
6. Members’s age:
7. Husband’s age:
8. Household income:
9. Member’s profession:
10. Members years of schooling:
11. Husband’s Profession
12. Husband years of schooling:
13. land owned:
14. buffaloes owned:
15. Ever been President of the group?
16. Ever been Secretary of the group?
17. Size of household:
18. No. of dependents:
19. No of children
20. no of female children:
21. no of male children:
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Questionnaire used in the Hathin Casestudy
Female Child
Age:
Year of schooling:
Age:
Year of schooling:
Age:
Male Child
Age:
Year of schooling:
Age:
Year of schooling:
Age:
Year of schooling:
22. Date the group started:
23. Date joining the group:
24. Duration of membership:
25. No. left group after it started:
26. Who invited you to the group?
27. How did the group start
28. How close are the group members?
29. Who took the first loan:
30. Ever borrowed from the group? (Y/N)
31. Amount of first loan:
32. Saving at the time of first loan:
33. Date of the first loan:
34. Purpose of the Loan?
35. Loan Bank linkage or Group Loan?
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Questionnaire used in the Hathin Casestudy
36. No. who borrowed before you?
37. How long waited after the need arose for the loan?
38. total saving at the time of loan
39. Who got the highest amount in loan?
40. Amount:
41. Who got the second highest amount in loan?
42. Amount?
43. Ever borrowed frommoneylender (Y/N):
44. Amount:
45. Rate of interest (per month):
46. Ever borrowed from a relative (Y/N):
47. Amount:
48. Rate of interest (per month):
49. Ever borrowed from a acquaintance (Y/N):
50. Amount:
51. Rate of interest (per month):
52. Ever borrowed from a public bank (Y/N):
53. Amount:
54. Rate of interest (per month):
55. Howmany group members live close by?
56. Howmany group member live far?
57. No. of members who you can encourage to repay?
58. What action would you take if they do not repay?
59. Would you visit their house
60. Would you ostracize them in any way
61. No. of member’s asset holding aware of?
62. No. of member’s household expenditure aware of?
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Glossary
ASCRA Accumulating Saving and Credit Association
Adhyaksha Secretary of the Group
CDO Community Development Officer
Crore 10 million
MFI Micro Finance Institution
MfO Microfinance Operator
mROSCA modified ROSCA
NABARD National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development,www.nabard.org
NGO Non-Governmental Organisations
NMDFC National Minorities Development Finance Corporation, www.nmdfc.org
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RMK Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (National Womens Fund),www.rmk.nic.in
Rs. Indian Currency Ruppees (£ 1 = Rs. 79)
ROSCA Rotating and Saving Credit Associations
SHG Self Help Group
SPYM Society for Promotion of Youth andMasses,www.spym.org
Sachiv President of the Group
Tehsil A administrative sub unit of a district in the India
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